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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 The Supreme Court’s 1982 Plyler v. Doe decision gave school-age undocumented 
immigrants the right to attend public schools.1  At that time, the number of undocumented 
immigrants and undocumented children was a small fraction of current estimates.  
Estimates presented later in this Article indicate that in 1980 the total number of 
undocumented immigrants was about two million.  In 2005, the estimated population was 
greater than eleven million.2  While the resident undocumented population has grown, the 
legal rights and privileges of undocumented immigrants have neither kept up with their 
population growth nor with the growth of their economic importance.  Many occupations 
and industries are largely staffed by undocumented immigrant workers, yet few of the 
recent laws and policies that apply to undocumented immigrants follow the precedent set 
by Plyler of recognizing the human needs of this population and also recognizing that 
many undocumented immigrants are working and living in the United States on a long-
term basis. 
¶2 One example of a recent law that denies the human needs of undocumented 
immigrants is the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA).3  It was passed as part of an anti-immigrant fervor that swept the country after 
Proposition 187 was approved by California voters in 1994.4  Section 505 of IIRIRA 
specifies that unauthorized aliens “shall not be eligible on the basis of residence within a 
State (or a political subdivision) for any postsecondary education benefit unless a citizen 
or national of the United States is eligible for such a benefit (in no less an amount, 
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1 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). 
2 See Table 4, infra notes 88-89. 
3 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1996). 
4 See id. 
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duration, and scope) without regard to whether the citizen or national is such a resident.”5  
Because of Section 505, states wishing to give undocumented immigrants the right to pay 
in-state tuition at public universities have passed laws providing this right.6  In addition to 
this federal law, over one hundred municipalities have passed anti-immigrant laws, 
including Farmers Branch, Texas, and Carpentersville, Illinois.7 
¶3 The goal of this Article is to provide demographic information and sociological 
perspectives that can help fill an apparent gap in the minds of many lawmakers and 
policymakers.  The demographic information consists of estimates of the undocumented 
immigrant school-age population around the time of the Plyler8 decision and in the 
present day.  This Article presents sociological perspectives of undocumented immigrants 
with the hope that they will help give future judicial decisions some of the informed and 
generous appreciation of the humanity of undocumented immigrants that is evident in 
Plyler.9  One of the sociological perspectives presented examines the racialization of 
undocumented immigrants.  An important cause of the gap in the understanding of 
undocumented immigrants is that they are all falsely assumed to all be Mexican.  This 
Article also offers a sociological perspective on guest worker programs.  Part of the 
explanation for the assumption that undocumented immigrants are from Mexico may be 
that it is the only country that has had a formal guest worker arrangement with the United 
States, known as the Bracero Program.10  While this guest worker program ended in 
1964, many aspects of our current immigration system have attributes of a de facto guest 
worker program.  This Article explains how the role of many employers in recruiting and 
encouraging undocumented immigrants further supports the contention that 
undocumented immigrants are de facto guest workers.  Finally, this Article examines the 
role of undocumented immigrants in the meatpacking industry to demonstrate their 
importance to certain industries. 
II. DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES ON UNDOCUMENTED CHILDREN 
¶4 It is a myth that a large proportion of United States school children are 
undocumented immigrants.  In 2000, undocumented children accounted for only one and 
one-half percent of all children enrolled in kindergarten through fifth grade and three 
percent of children in grades six through twelve.11  In addition, less than five percent of 
the kindergarten through twelfth grade students had undocumented parents.12 
                                                 
5 Id. § 1623(a). 
6 NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, BASIC FACTS ABOUT IN-STATE TUITION FOR UNDOCUMENTED 
IMMIGRANT STUDENTS 1-3 (2006). 
7 See CRISTINA RODRÍGUEZ, MUZAFFAR CHISHTI, & KIMBERLY NORTMAN, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, 
TESTING THE LIMITS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE LEGALITY OF STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION 
MEASURES 23, 30 (2007); Alex Kotlowitz, Our Town, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2007, § 6 (Magazine). 
8 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). 
9 See id. at 219 (stating that ineffective enforcement of immigration laws “raises the specter of a permanent 
caste of undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor, but 
nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes available to citizens and legal residents.”). 
10 Initiated in 1942, the Bracero Program operated for two decades as a labor program between the Mexican 
and U.S. governments and brought approximately five million agricultural laborers from Mexico to work 
temporarily in the United States.  Muzaffar Chishti, A Redesigned Immigration Selection System, 41 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 115, 118 n.16 (2008). 
11 RANDY CAPPS & MICHAEL FIX, UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS: MYTHS AND REALITY 1 (2005). 
12 Id. 
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¶5 The proportion of the United States population comprised of immigrants is now 
approaching the historic high level of about fifteen percent, which the United States 
experienced as the wave of European immigrants crested around the beginning of the 
twentieth century.13  There is a major difference between the new immigration and the 
old.  Now, most of the immigrants are Latino rather than European.14 
 
Table 1: Racial-ethnic composition of the U.S. foreign-born population, 1970-2005 
Year Total  
Foreign- 
Born 
White, not  
Hispanic Origin 





(of any race) 
197015 9,619,302 7,056,104 (73.4%) 253,458 (2.6%) 544,437 (5.7%) 1,802,332 (18.7%) 
198016 14,079,906 6,954,062 (49.4%) 815,720 (5.8%) 2,182,639 (15.5%) 4,172,851 (29.6%) 
199017 19,767,316 6,167,343 (31.2%) 1,455,294 (7.4%) 4,558,744 (21.7%) 7,841,650 (39.7%) 
200018 31,107,890 6,840,530 (22.0%) 2,099,865 (6.8%) 7,012,200 (22.5%) 14,157,815 (45.5%) 
200519 35,689,842 7,459,177 (20.9%) 2,997,947 (7.6%) 8,565,566 (23.5%) 16,667,156 (47.0%) 
 
¶6 Mexico is the largest source of all immigrants in the United States and more than 
half of undocumented immigrants are from Mexico.20  Information on the origins of the 
non-Latino undocumented immigrants is difficult to find.  As shown in Table 2, the 2005 
estimates indicate that about seventy-eight percent of undocumented immigrants are from 
Latin America. 
                                                 
13 JEFFREY PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., U.S. POPULATION PROJECTIONS: 2005-2050, at 
2, 13, and Figure 2 (2008), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/85.pdf (last visited Aug. 6, 
2008). 
14 See Tables 1 and 2. 
15 Campbell J. Gibson & Emily Lennon, Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-born Population in the 
United States: 1850-1990 Table 8 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population Division Working Paper No. 29, 
1999), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/twps0029.html (last 
visited Aug. 6, 2008). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE OF SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE 
FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION 1 (2000), available at http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/stp-
159/foreignborn.pdf (last visited Aug. 6, 2008) [hereinafter FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION]. 
19 Calculated from data presented in U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NATIVE 
AND FOREIGN-BORN POPULATIONS [hereinafter NATIVE AND FOREIGN-BORN POPULATIONS]. 
20 KARINA FORTUNY, RANDY CAPPS & JEFFREY S. PASSEL, THE CHARACTERISTICS OF UNAUTHORIZED 
IMMIGRANTS IN CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES COUNTY, AND THE UNITED STATES 5 (2007), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411425_Characteristics_Immigrants.pdf (last visited Aug. 6, 2008); 
see also Table 2, infra notes 21-25. 
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Table 2: Undocumented Immigrants Residing in the U.S. from Mexico, Latin America, 
and All Countries, 1980-2005 
 198021 199022 199623 200524 
All countries  2,057,000 3,500,000 5,000,000 11,100,000 
Mexico 1,131,000 2,040,000 2,700,000 6,200,000 
Other Latin American Countries 
listed in report25 
351,000 706,000 725,000 2,500,000 
Total Latino Origin Countries 1,482,000 2,746,000 3,425,000 8,700,000 
Latino Origin as % of Total 72.0% 78.4% 68.5% 78.4% 
 
¶7 Table 3 presents the estimated growth of the number of undocumented residents for 
the states with the largest populations. 
 
Table 3: States with the Largest Number of Undocumented Residents, 1980-2005 
 198026 199027 199628 200429 
California 1,024,000 1,476,000 2,000,000 2,450,000 
Texas 186,000 438,000 700,000 1,380,000 
New York 234,000 357,000 540,000 635,000 
Florida 80,000 239,000 350,000 885,000 
Illinois 135,000 194,000 290,000 405,000 
Arizona 25,000 88,000 115,000 450,000 
North Carolina - - - 395,000 
New Jersey 37,000 95,000 135,000 355.000 
Georgia - - - 350,000 
Colorado 19,000 31,000 45,000 230,000 
New Mexico 13,000 - 37,000 50,000 
 
                                                 
21 See Jeffrey S. Passel & Karen A. Woodrow, Geographic Distribution of Undocumented Immigrants: 
Estimates of Undocumented Aliens Counted in the 1980 Census by State, 18 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 642, 
644-49, 651-54 (1984). 
22 OFF. OF POL’Y AND PLAN., U.S. IMMIGR. AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ESTIMATES OF THE 
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990 TO 2000, Table B (2003), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/Ill_Report_1211.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 6, 2008) [hereinafter ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION]. 
23 U.S. IMMIGR. AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ILLEGAL ALIEN RESIDENT POPULATION 6 (Table 1) 
(1996), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/illegal.pdf (last visited Aug. 6, 2008) 
[hereinafter ILLEGAL ALIEN RESIDENT POPULATION]. 
24 JEFFREY S. PASSEL, THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN 
THE U.S.: ESTIMATES BASED ON THE MARCH 2005 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 4-5 (Pew Hispanic 
Center 2007). 
25 These countries include El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, Honduras, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, 
Brazil, Haiti, and Peru. 
26 Passel & Woodrow, supra note 21. 
27 ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION, supra note 22, at 7-8 (Table A). 
28 ILLEGAL ALIEN RESIDENT POPULATION, supra note 23. 
29 FORTUNY, CAPPS & PASSEL, supra note 20, at 43. 
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III. RACIALIZATION OF MEXICANS, LATINOS AND UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 
¶8 Even though Mexicans comprise a little more than half of undocumented 
immigrants, Mexicans and undocumented immigrants are often conflated as one and the 
same.  It is interesting that this conflation can be seen in the Texas lower court decisions 
that preceded the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Plyler: 
[S]ection 21.031 of the Texas Education Code violates the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth amendment and hence is 
unconstitutional.  Therefore, the defendants will be permanently enjoined 
from applying Section 21.031 of the Texas Education Code and the policy 
adopted by the Board of Trustees of the Tyler I.S.D. on July 21, 1977, so 
as to deny free public education to any children in the Tyler I.S.D. solely 
on the basis of their status as undocumented Mexican aliens.30 
¶9 Although the decision applied to all undocumented children, the generally well-
written and sympathetic opinion assumed that all undocumented children in Tyler, Texas 
were Mexican.  However, the history of the Plyler case and future decisions that revisit 
the same issue will be shaped and colored by the same two-way identification of 
Mexicans and undocumented immigrants; i.e., the common assumption that 
undocumented immigrants are from Mexico and that Mexican immigrants are in the 
United States illegally. 
¶10 Moreover, the label “Mexican” is commonly applied to Latinos regardless of their 
national origin and descent.  Only some are actually “Mexican,” i.e., former or current 
citizens of Mexico.  Latinos are racialized as (a) non-white people, (b) all of whom are 
from Mexico, (c) illegal aliens, (d) having few rights because of their illegality, and  
(e) encroaching on the United States for exploitative purposes.  That is, they are 
commonly viewed as part of a subordinate, non-white group which, because of their 
presumed illegal status, has diluted claims to rights and privileges that many Anglo 
Americans take for granted.  The fact that many Latinos are given the label “Mexican,” 
even though some are U.S. citizens and U.S.-born children of U.S.-born parents, 
demonstrates that they are racialized.  As shown in other research,31 this social 
construction is a major factor in determining where Latinos live, what work they can do, 
their privileges as citizens, and the educational opportunities available to their children.  
My analysis documents the racialization32 of Latinos with data from the rural Midwest 
                                                 
30 Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 593 (E.D. Tex. 1978) (emphasis added). 
31 See, e.g., ANN MILLARD & JORGE CHAPA, ET AL., APPLE PIE AND ENCHILADAS: LATINO NEWCOMERS IN 
THE RURAL MIDWEST (2004) (presenting research explaining the causes and consequences of the Latino 
influx into Midwestern villages and towns, particularly exploring interactions of Anglos and Latinos in 
daily life and their division of labor in local economies). 
32 Although they do not focus on Latinos, Omi and Winant lay out an approach to race that describes the 
Mexican immigrant situation quite well.  They define racial formation as “the process by which social, 
economic, and political forces determine the content and importance of racial categories, and by which they 
are in turn shaped by racial meanings.”  For them, race is the “fundamental organizing principle” of the 
American social order and is evident in “every identity, institution and social practice in the United States.”  
For them and for us, race is a social and historical construct.  The term racialization is used to “signify the 
extension of racial meaning to a previously racially unclassified relationship, social practice or group.”  
MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 
1990S 61-69 (1986). 
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and highlights the shortcomings of immigration policy that stem in part from that process.  
Moreover, throughout the twentieth century, United States immigration policy treated 
Mexicans differently than other groups.  Generally, the exceptions in immigration policy 
were aimed at ensuring a plentiful supply of Mexican workers for agriculture and other 
industries—workers who could easily be sent back to Mexico when they were no longer 
needed.33 
IV. MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS AND DE JURE GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
¶11 One of the most important factors driving the immigration process is previous 
migration.  The start of large-scale undocumented migration from Mexico to the United 
States came with the termination of the Bracero Program in 1964.34  This program began 
during World War II as a way of permitting Mexican immigrants to work in the United 
States on a temporary basis.35  This was a means of increasing the number of laborers 
who were then in very short supply.  During World War II, braceros were used in 
agriculture and in the maintenance and repair of railroads. 36  The Bracero Program 
proved to be very popular with agriculture employers and was successively renewed until 
1964.37  It was then ended by Congress as part of major immigration reform because 
employers commonly violated provisions regarding wages, work rules, and housing 
conditions.38  
¶12 Likewise, the rapid increase of undocumented Mexican immigrants in areas in 
which there is no settled Mexican or Latino community has, in some cases, been tied to 
the hiring of documented temporary migrant workers under the H-2A labor contracting 
program.39  Since the end of the Bracero Program, this has been the only de jure 
temporary foreign agricultural worker program in the United States.  This program was 
started as the H-2 program in 1952 and changed to the H-2A program in 1986.40  Like 
                                                 
33 DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN AMERICA 168-75 
(2002). 
34 Jorge Durand, Douglas S. Massey & Rene Zenteno, Mexican Immigration to the United States: 
Continuities and Changes, 36 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 107, 111 (2001).  Note that in Spanish, a bracero is a 
manual laborer. 
35 Id. at 110. 
36 See BARBARA A. DRISCOLL, THE TACKS NORTH: THE RAILROAD BRACERO PROGRAM OF WORLD WAR II 
ix-x (1999) (documenting railroad workers’ participation in the Bracero Program). 
37 Durand, Massey & Zenteno, supra note 34, at 110-11. 
38 Jorge Durand, Douglas S. Massey & Fernando Charvet, The Changing Geography of Mexican 
Immigration to the United States: 1910-1996, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 1, 2 (2000); ALMA M. GARCIA, THE 
MEXICAN AMERICANS 30-34 (2002). 
39 Wasem and Collver note the development of the H-2A program: “Since 1964, the only legal temporary 
foreign agricultural worker program in the United States has been the nonimmigrant visa program known 
as H-2/H-2A.  A nonimmigrant is an alien legally in the United States for a specific purpose and a 
temporary period of time, such as foreign students, tourists, or diplomats.  There are 70 nonimmigrant visa 
categories specified in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and they are commonly referred to by 
the letter that denotes their section in the statute.  The major nonimmigrant category for temporary workers 
is the H visa.  The temporary foreign agricultural worker program was first authorized as the H-2 program 
in 1952 and amended as the H-2A program in 1986.”  RUTH ELLEN WASEM & GEOFFREY K. COLLVER, 
IMMIGRATION OF AGRICULTURAL GUEST WORKERS: POLICY, TRENDS, AND LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 2 (2003), 
available at http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/03Jun/RL30852.pdf (last visited Aug. 6, 2008). 
40 Id. at 1-2. 
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most other temporary labor migration or guest worker programs in many different parts 
of the world, the H-2A temporary worker program led to permanent settlements of 
undocumented migrants in the United States.41 
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT AND OTHER 
ATTEMPTS TO SEAL THE BORDER WITH MEXICO 
¶13 Efforts to decrease undocumented immigration may have prevented its further 
expansion, but they have not actually reduced it.  For example, the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) did not result in a decrease in undocumented 
immigration because the sanctions for employing undocumented immigrants were not 
consistently enforced.42  The huge increase in the number of undocumented immigrants 
reported in Tables 1 and 2 above strongly suggests that IIRIRA did not decrease the 
number of undocumented immigrants, despite its attempts to further restrict 
undocumented migration to the United States.  The number of Border Patrol agents was 
increased substantially, and the increased level of surveillance at the border did result in a 
large increase in the death rate of border crossers.43  One of the major factors behind this 
increased mortality is that border enforcement efforts in previously popular border 
crossings on California and Texas have increased the number of immigrants crossing 
through the Arizona border.44  Before the increase in border surveillance, many 
undocumented immigrants were short-term sojourners who worked in the United States 
for short periods and then returned.45  The strict border enforcement, however, ironically 
increased the number of Mexican and Central American immigrants staying in the United 
States for long periods of time.46  The increased risk, cost, and difficulty of border 
crossing has turned them into long-term residents.47 
¶14 In addition to the wage differential, another important factor driving the 
immigration process is previous migration.  Since IRCA was enacted in 1986, almost 
three million formerly undocumented immigrants have been given amnesty to remain in 
the United States, and many of them sponsored additional immigrants.48  The way in 
which IRCA was formulated, implemented, and enforced (or not enforced) had a 
tremendous impact on increasing the size of the settled undocumented population.  Note 
the following analysis: 
                                                 
41 Martin Ruhs, Temporary Foreign Worker Programmes: Policies, Adverse Consequences, and the Need 
to Make Them Work 38-44 (The Ctr. for Comparative Immigration Studies at the Univ. of Cal. at San 
Diego, Working Paper No. 56, June 2002), available at http://www.ccis-ucsd.org/publications/wrkg56.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 6, 2008). 
42 Wayne A. Cornelius, Controlling ‘Unwanted’ Immigration: Lessons from the United States, 1993-2004, 
31 J. OF ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 775, 785-86 (2005). 
43 Wayne A. Cornelius, Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of U.S. Immigration 
Control, 27 POL’Y POPULATION AND DEV. REV. 661, 669-76 (2001). 
44 Id. 
45 Cornelius, supra note 42, at 782; see also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, BACKFIRE AT THE BORDER: WHY 
ENFORCEMENT WITHOUT LEGALIZATION CANNOT STOP ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 6-7 (2005). 
46 Cornelius, supra note 42, at 782. 
47 Id.  
48 Susan Gonzalez Baker, The "Amnesty" Aftermath: Current Policy Issues Stemming from the Legalization 
Programs of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, 31 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 5, 6, 22-23 (1997). 
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The passage of IRCA inaugurated a new era of Mexico – United States 
migration in which the United States applied increasingly coercive 
sanctions and border controls in an effort to constrict established flows 
while offering regularization to undocumented farm workers and long-
term settlers already in the country.  The rising hazards of border crossing 
and the ongoing economic crisis in Mexico gave undocumented migrants 
new reasons to remain abroad and, when combined with IRCA’s 
legalization of 2.3 million persons, tilted Mexican immigration decisively 
toward permanent United States settlement.  In a few short years it was 
transformed from a seasonal, undocumented, and regionally specific flow 
in which rural males predominated into an urbanized and substantially 
female population of permanent settlers who were increasingly dispersed 
throughout the United States.  In the nine years from 1987 through 1995, 
2.7 million Mexicans were admitted to permanent resident status, twice 
the number admitted over the prior twenty-two years.49 
IRCA was also a major contributor to the growth of the undocumented immigrant 
population as a national, rather than a regional, phenomenon.50 
VI. UNDOCUMENTED MEXICAN IMMIGRATION AS A DE FACTO GUEST WORKER PROGRAM 
¶15 If an event occurs twelve million times, it is meaningless to call it an accident.  
Occurrences of this magnitude must be seen as part of a system.  The twelve million or so 
undocumented immigrants have provided U.S. employers with a de facto guest worker 
system.  In my view, U.S. employers who encourage, recruit, hire, advise, manipulate, 
and lobby for undocumented immigrant workers play a major role in making this system 
run.  The system thrives in a context in which aspects of both U.S. immigration policies 
and economic policies work to increase the number of long-term undocumented residents 
in the United States. 
¶16 For many years, undocumented immigrants have provided the United States with a 
de facto guest worker program.  United States employers benefit from the ready supply of 
reliable workers who are willing to do onerous work for low wages.51  Also, the 
employers do not have to directly bear most of the costs associated with administering 
this “program” or the expenses involved due to the rapid increase in the number of 
immigrants living in the community where the employers are located.52  The 
communities to which immigrants migrate, however, do incur the costs associated with 
providing services to a rapidly growing, low-income, non-English speaking population.53  
The immigrants are motivated to participate in this de facto system because they can 
                                                 
49 Jorge Durand, Douglas S. Massey & Emilio A. Parrado, The New Era of Mexican Migration to the 
United States, 86 J. AM. HIST. 518, 535 (1999). 
50 Durand, Massey & Charvet, supra note 38, at 9-13. 
51 Wayne A. Cornelius, The Structural Embeddedness of Demand for Mexican Immigrant Labor: New 
Evidence from California, in CROSSINGS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 
125-28 (Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco, ed., 1998). 
52 MILLARD & CHAPA, supra note 31, at 204-21. 
53 Lourdes Gouveia & Donald Stull, Dances with Cows: Beefpacking’s Impact on Garden City, KS, and 
Lexington, NE, in ANY WAY YOU CUT IT: MEAT PROCESSING AND SMALL-TOWN AMERICA 85 (Donald D. 
Stull, Michael J. Broadway & David Griffith eds., 1995). 
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make much more money in the United States than they could in their home countries.54  
However, they also bear many of the costs and risks associated with immigration.  Such 
risks include the actual financial cost of migrating, the risk of dying in the process, the 
inability to obtain drivers’ licenses, and the myriad of other problems that stem from 
living in the United States without legal authorization.55  Even considering the 
willingness of Mexican people to come here, Mexican immigrants are disposable and 
disrespected workers. 
¶17 A unique and perverse aspect of this or any other de facto system, moreover, is that 
the terms and conditions of the system can be changed at any time.  For example, changes 
in the enforcement polices under the Bush administration in 2006 (apparently to show 
that the Administration could indeed control the border and enforce immigration laws) 
resulted in an increase in the number of employers arrested for employing undocumented 
immigrants.56  This is a huge increase over the twenty-five employers arrested a few 
years earlier, but close to insignificant compared to the “hundreds of thousands” of 
employers of undocumented immigrants nationwide.57 
VII. NAFTA AND MIGRATION 
¶18 Increased international economic integration has contributed to the rise of Mexican 
immigration to the United States for several reasons.  First, United States exports have 
undermined broad sectors of the Mexican economy, dislocated millions of workers and 
their dependents, and increased the motivation for emigration.58  The sector that is most 
likely to be affected by the full implementation of NAFTA is agriculture.59  NAFTA has 
increased migration from Mexico to the United States because the importation of 
government-subsidized U.S.-grown agricultural goods undermined the economic viability 
of many Mexican farmers.60  Perhaps in the decades ahead, migration from Mexico may 
                                                 
54 Id. 
55 MILLARD & CHAPA, supra note 31, at 204-21. 
56 Note the following quote from a recent report in the San Francisco Chronicle: “The administration’s new 
policy intensifies an approach already in motion by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, which has 
stepped up criminal prosecutions of companies that conspire to employ illegal immigrants.  In the first 10 
months of the current fiscal year, ICE made 745 criminal arrests and 3,561 administrative arrests of 
employers and employees, eight times as many as in all of 2002.”  Tyche Hendricks, Illegal Immigrants 
Choice: Work Underground or Leave, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 27, 2007, available at 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/08/27/MN0JRNMGF.DTL&tsp=1 (last visited Aug. 
6, 2008). 
57 Cornelius, supra note 43, at 788. 
58 ALEJANDRO PORTES, CENTER FOR MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT, NAFTA AND MEXICAN 
IMMIGRATION 1-2 (2006), available at 
http://cmd.princeton.edu/papers/NAFTA%20and%20Mexican%20Immigration.pdf (last visited Aug. 6, 
2008). 
59 Additional agricultural barriers and tariffs were lifted on January 1, 2008.  As stated by the United States 
Department of Agriculture, “[t]he final provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
were fully implemented in 2008 . . . .  With full implementation, the last remaining trade restriction on a 
handful of agricultural commodities such as U.S. exports to Mexico of corn, dry edible beans, nonfat dry 
milk and high fructose corn syrup and Mexican exports to the United States of sugar and certain 
horticultural products are now removed.”  U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT (NAFTA) FACT SHEET (2008) available at 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/factsheets/NAFTA1.14.2008.pdf (last visited Aug. 6, 2008). 
60 Louis Uchitelle, Nafta Should Have Stopped Illegal Immigration, Right?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2007, at 
WK4. 
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decrease as a consequence of economic and political reform, but the immediate question 
is how many more Mexicans will immigrate to the United States over the next decade. 
¶19 It is generally agreed that there is a net economic benefit to the United States as a 
whole from undocumented Mexican migration.  These migrants work very hard at 
generally undesirable jobs for wages that are low compared to others in the United States.  
At a national level, undocumented migrants pay far more in taxes than they consume in 
social services.  In a recent review of the literature, Cornelius and Rosenblum say that 
immigrants to the United States are “net contributors to the federal treasury.”61  Also at 
the national level, despite numerous research efforts, undocumented immigrants have not 
been shown to have a major negative effect on the employment or earnings of U.S.-born 
minorities.  Cornelius and Rosenblum assert that “negative wage effects in the U.S. case . 
. . are quite small . . . and their scope is mainly limited to recent migrants, African-
Americans, and workers who lack a high school education.”62  Furthermore, access to 
government benefits, especially welfare, is not a motive for undocumented migration.  
Douglas S. Massey claims that it is a myth that “migrants are attracted to the United 
States by generous public benefits.”63  He argues that: 
Immigrants are less likely than natives to use public services.  While 66 
percent of Mexican immigrants report the withholding of Social Security 
taxes from their paychecks and 62 percent say that employers withhold 
income taxes, only 10 percent say they have ever sent a child to U.S. 
public schools, 7 percent indicate they have received Supplemental 
Security Income, and 5 percent or less report ever using food stamps, 
welfare, or unemployment compensation.64 
¶20 In the aggregate, minority workers have benefited from the economic contributions 
of undocumented immigrants.65  While these policy decisions may have accelerated the 
settlement of undocumented immigrants in the United States, it is unlikely that Plyler 
would have ever been adjudicated if some undocumented immigrants and their 
undocumented children had not settled in Texas for the long term in the 1970s.  Esteban 
Flores interviewed 105 parents of undocumented children attending private schools in 
Houston for that population.  He reports that, “[m]ost of our sample of respondents were 
obviously here to stay . . . .”66 
                                                 
61 Wayne A. Cornelius & Marc R. Rosenblum, Immigration & Politics, 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 99, 103 
(2005). 
62 Id. at 104. 
63 Douglas S. Massey, Five Myths about Immigration: Common Misconceptions Underlying U.S. Border-
Enforcement Policy, IMMIGR. DAILY, Dec. 7, 2005, available at http://www.ilw.com/articles/2005,1207-
massey.shtm (last visited Aug. 6, 2008). 
64 Id. 
65 Immigration: Economic Impacts: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. 1-4 (2006) 
(testimony of Harry J. Holzer, Professor of Public Policy, Georgetown University). 
66 Estevan T. Flores, Research on Undocumented Immigrants and Public Policy: A Study of the Texas 
School Case, 18 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 505, 515 (1984) (emphasis added). 
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VIII. THE ROLE OF EMPLOYERS IN ENCOURAGING UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION 
¶21 Employers in the United States play a major role in sustaining high levels of 
undocumented Latino immigration.  Employers typically perceive that Latino immigrants 
have the following traits: (1) they are willing to do low-pay work that is boring, dirty, or 
dangerous, with no prospects for upward mobility; (2) they are reliable, flexible, 
punctual, and will work overtime; and (3) immigrant transnational labor recruitment 
networks are a powerful means for “delivering eager new recruits to the employer’s 
doorstep with little or no effort on his part.”67 
¶22 Large-scale undocumented migration to the United States would not exist without a 
strong demand by employers.68  The ubiquitous penetration of the transnational labor 
recruitment network drew Latino immigrants to areas where Latinos and Latino 
immigrants had previously been scarce.69  Table 3 shows the growth of the 
undocumented immigrant population both in states that are common destinations (like 
California, Texas, and New York), and even more rapid growth of this population in 
states that previously had small numbers of undocumented immigrants.  It is safe to 
conclude that some of the extremely high rates of growth in states with recent rapid 
Latino population growth like North Carolina (almost 400% increase between 1990 and 
2000) and Georgia (almost 300% increase) are due in part to the migration and settlement 
of U.S.-born Latinos and the secondary migration of Latino immigrants who had first 
settled in traditional areas.  While international migration was the major source of Latino 
population growth in the United States, secondary migration of U.S.-born Latinos to new 
states was also important,70 as was growth due to births.71 
IX. RURAL MEATPACKING TOWNS AS EXEMPLARS OF THE DE FACTO GUEST WORKER 
PROGRAM 
¶23 One example of the growth of undocumented immigrant populations and the 
recruitment and employment practices of employers can be found in towns with new 
meatpacking or other agricultural processing plants.  Often these plants are located in 
rural areas and the town residents and leaders welcome them as economic development 
engines that will create jobs and revive the generally lagging rural economy.72  Typically 
the town residents sour on these deals when they discover that the jobs created by these 
plants are unattractive to most local residents because they are difficult, dangerous, and 
pay low wages.73  Despite these attributes, Latino immigrants are willing to move to these 
                                                 
67 Wayne A. Cornelius, The Structural Embeddedness of Demand for Mexican Immigrant Labor: New 
Evidence from California, in CROSSINGS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 
114, 125 (Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco, ed., 1998).  One example in which the transnational recruitment 
network operates is richly detailed by Robert Suro.  See generally, ROBERT SURO, STRANGERS AMONG US: 
HOW LATINO IMMIGRATION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICA, 31-55 (1998). 
68 Cornelius, supra note 51, at 125-28. 
69 LEIF JENSEN, CARSEY INST., NEW IMMIGRANT SETTLEMENTS IN RURAL AMERICA: PROBLEMS, 
PROSPECTS, AND POLICIES 17-21 (2006). 
70 Durand, Massey & Charvet, supra note 38, at 10-11. 
71 PASSEL & COHN, supra note 13, at 15. 
72 William Kandel and Emilio A. Parrado, Restructuring of the US Meat Processing Industry and New 
Hispanic Migrant Destinations, 31 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 447, 456 (2005). 
73 MILLARD & CHAPA, supra note 31, at 47-73. 
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towns and take these jobs.74  While these rural towns often have experience with Latino 
migrant agricultural workers, the influx of Latino immigrants that come after the plant is 
built usually is the town’s first experience with a resident Latino population that can grow 
to number up to half of the town’s total residents.75  Moreover, meatpacking creates 
unusually high population mobility.  Employee turnover is very high, as workers have a 
hard time staying at the job for a long period of time because of injuries and dislike for 
the job.76  Since plants constantly hire new workers, there is a constant stream of 
newcomers.77 
¶24 The educational needs of Latinos pose another challenge.  Although Plyler 
guarantees the right of undocumented children to attend public schools, there is no 
guarantee that these children will find schools or teachers that are prepared to teach them 
in Spanish or to help them learn English.78  When these new Latino workers, present in 
the meatpacking plants and numerous other jobs in the United States, immigrate to this 
country, they bring their children with them.  The educational needs of these Latino 
children pose another challenge. 
X. THE MIGRATION OF UNDOCUMENTED CHILDREN 
¶25 I can offer two perspectives on the settlement process of undocumented immigrants 
and their children in the post-Bracero Program era.  In the first part of this period, even 
though most undocumented immigrants were sojourners, or temporary migrants, some 
settled for the long term and subsequently brought their foreign-born children to live with 
them.79  This settlement process brought the 10,000 or so undocumented children to the 
Houston area in the late 1970s.80  These children were at the core of Plyler.  The 
increased enforcement of the border in 1994 can be seen as resulting in a rapid 
acceleration and increase in the magnitude of a settlement process that likely would have 
occurred anyway.  The data presented in Table 1 illustrates both of these increases.81 
¶26 There are several accounts that suggest that post-1994 border crossers often come 
initially without their children and subsequently struggle mightily to bring their children 
too.82  One vivid example can be found in the CNN documentary, Immigrant Nation: 
Divided Country.83  A story of one woman provides a compelling illustration of how 
migration can split families and how difficult it can be to reunite family members: 
Rosa, 28 years old and a single mother[, . . .] spends every waking 
moment working to bring her children across. Rosa first came to Georgia 
two years ago all alone.  Last year, unable to bear the separation any 
                                                 
74 Kandel and Parrado, supra note 72, at 456. 
75 MILLARD & CHAPA, supra note 31, at 1-21, 47-73, 125-48. 
76 Kandel and Parrado, supra note 72, at 457-60. 
77 MILLARD & CHAPA, supra note 31, at 1-21, 47-73, 125-48. 
78 MILLARD & CHAPA, supra note 31, at 149-68, 204-21. 
79 Flores, supra note 66. 
80 Id. 
81 See supra notes 15-19. 
82 CNN Presents: Immigrant Nation: Divided Country (CNN television broadcast Oct. 17, 2004), transcript 
available at http://www.theamericanresistance.com/articles/art2005apr17.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2008). 
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longer, Rosa paid a smuggler $5,000 to wade her children across the river 
at night.  But they were caught at a checkpoint and immediately deported. 
Rosa faced a difficult decision.  Rosa calculates it will take her several 
months to save enough to try the dangerous crossing again.  Every day, 
[sic] she’s able to work and make a few dollars is a day closer to a reunion 
with her children.  Hers is a hard, lonely struggle. 
Just last week, Rosa tried again to bring her children to the United States. 
Her mother and uncle drove the children more than 20 hours to the border 
town . . . . 
Rosa’s children were driven to the border by strangers and prepared to be 
smuggled by car.  The smugglers would be paid almost $6,000 by Rosa if 
they were successful, would show border agents false papers for the 
children.  They didn't make it.  Despite their fake papers, Junior and 
Rosita were detained.  The smugglers were arrested.  The children were 
returned to Mexico and reunited with their grandmother.  Despite the 
setback, Rosa vows to try again.84 
The PBS documentary, Maid in America,85 also covers similar ground: 
Judith came to the United States with her husband in search of a better 
future for her four children and her elderly mother, who live in a shack in 
Guatemala.  But when Judith gets pregnant again and can neither perform 
heavy manual labor nor afford childcare for new baby Everest, [she 
returns to Guatemala]. 
The film’s website has an update: 
After moving back to Guatemala, Judith returned to the U.S. in March 
2005.  Judith's daughters and family were heavily affected by the 
devastating rains in the Mexico/Guatemala border region a month or so 
ago [early October 2005].  When I saw Judith and her husband Alvaro last 
week, he was getting ready to go back to Guatemala to help their family 
rebuild.86 
These vignettes illustrate the fact that it is difficult for undocumented immigrants to 
subsequently bring their children.  They also illustrate that many undocumented 
immigrants live transnational lives, with family, houses, and problems in both their home 
country and the United States. 
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XI. PLYLER’S CHILDREN AND THEIR U.S.-BORN BROTHERS AND SISTERS 
¶27 This Article has briefly addressed the major factors behind the growth and 
settlement of the undocumented immigrant population throughout the United States and 
the growth of the undocumented school-age population in several states.87  Latino 
immigrants contribute to the growth of the school-age population in two ways.  One is by 
giving birth to children in the United States who are American citizens and by bringing 
their foreign-born undocumented children to the United States.  The increase in U.S.-born 
children of Latino immigrants may contribute to a relative diminution in the proportion of 
school-age children who are themselves undocumented.  Table 4 shows that in 1980, 
21.2% of the undocumented population was under age of 18. 
 







All ages 2,057,000 11,100,000 440%
Under Age 18 436,000* 1,800,000 313%
% Under Age 18 21.2% 16.2%
(*interpolated) 
 








New Jersey 58,000 
Colorado 37,000 
New Mexico 8,000 
 
¶28 The data for 2005 suggests that only 16.2% of a much larger population was 
school-age children.  There are several possible explanations that could be behind the 
lower proportion in 2005: (1) many undocumented immigrants are now sufficiently 
settled in the United States to have children born in the United States, (2) it may now be 
more difficult for undocumented immigrants to bring their children to the United States, 
(3) fertility rates may have fallen, (4) the composition of the adult population may have 
changed, and (5) some combination of the previous four factors.  Detailed analysis by 
Passel shows that for families in which the head of the household is undocumented, two-
thirds of the children are United States citizens and one-third are undocumented.91 
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89 PASSEL, supra note 24. 
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XII. CONCLUSION 
¶29 In the rural Midwest, the century-long history of recruiting Mexican workers to 
factories and farms has been accompanied by civil rights abuses and Latino 
subordination, which I analyzed as part of the process of racialization, with significant 
consequences for United States immigration policy.  The Mexicanization of 
undocumented immigration, both in terms of the growing proportion of this group who 
are from Mexico and in terms of the racialization of all Latino immigrants as 
“Mexicans,”92 along with a resurgent negative animus against Mexican immigrants 
suggests that a reconsideration of the issues resolved in Plyler may result in a negative 
outcome for undocumented children. 
¶30 The sense of urgency for revisiting and rethinking that policy is increasing with the 
continuing growth of immigration from Latin America, the increasingly repressive 
practices on the United States-Mexico border, and the pressures to ensure homeland 
security.  A future court decision or act of Congress could bar undocumented children 
from attending U.S. public schools.  Such an action would punish children who 
themselves, as is commonly said, did no wrong since they were brought to this country 
by their parents.  A restriction on the rights granted by Plyler would also punish the 
parents who were encouraged to migrate by U.S. employers, or forced to migrate as a 
consequence of policies such as NAFTA.  We can hope that comprehensive immigration 
reform would result in immigration policies and practices that are consistent with the 
pressures and incentives created by U.S. economic policies and practices. 
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